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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bennett Scales appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his request for an overnight recess in his trial after the State rested its case at
nearly four in the afternoon on the first day of trial, which was scheduled for two days.
He based that argument on an analysis of several relevant factors identified in
precedent. He also asserts that the denial of the requested recess infringed on several
of his constitutional rights.
The State responds, contending that the identified factors are not applicable in
this case because the cases setting forth those factors were discussing a specific
factual scenario that does not exist in Mr. Scales' case.

It also asserts, 1Nithout

argument or explanation, that there was no infringement of Mr. Scale's constitutional
rights. Rather, it claims that Mr. Scales cited no authority to support his argument that
his rights had been violated. The State's arguments are without merit.
Mr. Scales responds to explain why the identified factors do apply, and how his
constitutional rights were, in fact, violated, as demonstrated by the precedent cited in his
Appellant's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Scales' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion, promoting
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for a
eviscerated several of Mr.
constitutional rights.

2

on
in so doing,

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Promoting A Myopic Insistence On
Expeditiousness In The Face Of A Justifiable Request For A Recess, And In So Doing,
Eviscerated Several Of Mr. Scales' Constitutional Rights

A.

The Relevant Factors Identified In Precedent Guide The Analysis In This Appeal
And Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Denying The Requested
Recess
Mr. Scales argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his

request for a recess. In his Appellant's Brief, he relied on several factors discussed in
precedent, notably those identified in State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546 ( 1993 ), and State v.
Carman, 114 Idaho

1 (Ct. App. 1988), which are relevant to an evaluation of whether

the district court erred in denying a requested continuance. Specifically, those factors
include:

(1) the timing of the motion; (2) the requested length of delay, including

whether the delay is an attempt to manipulate the proceedings; (3) the number, if any,
of similar continuances sought by the defendant; (4) the inconvenience to witnesses;
and (5) any prejudice to the prosecution.

Pratt, 125 Idaho at 555-56; Carman, 114

Idaho at 793. Those cases identified two other factors which were not relevant to the
facts at issue in Mr. Scales' case:

(1) whether there was an irreconcilable conflict

between client and counsel, and (2) the qualifications of counsel to represent the client
in the pending matter. Id. The State contends that, because the factual scenario in this
case is not identical to the factual scenarios in Pratt and Carman, a "partial-application
of Pratt and Carman absent a deprivation of the right to proceed with counsel of choice"
is not justified. (Resp. Br., p.11.) Basically, it argues that those cases should be limited
to the specific factual scenarios they addressed.
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The State's position is untenable because

have

some, but not all, of those same factors in assessing decisions on motions
for continuances. In each case, the courts considered only those factors relevant to the
facts at issue. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "the trial court clearly
focused on relevant reasons for either granting or denying the continuance," as it
affirmed the denial of the motion to continue to allow adequate time to reform the
defense strategy after one of the counts was dismissed on the morning of trial. State v.
Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 707 (1993) (specifically considering the timing of the motion,
the length of the requested delay, the inconvenience to witnesses, and the prejud
the prosecution) (emphasis added).

to

And what the Idaho Supreme Court implied in

Ransom about the propriety of assessing only the relevant factors, the Court of Appeals
has recently and expressly held: "Thus, application of the
Cag/e[1] is appropriate."

described in

State v. DeWitt, 153 Idaho 658, 664 (Ct. App. 2012)

(considering the timing of the motion, the length of the proposed delay, and the
inconvenience to witnesses to determine that there was no abuse of discretion in
denying the motion for continuance to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel)
(emphasis added).
Those decisions are consistent with numerous other decisions where Idaho's
appellate courts have considered

claims regarding decisions on

requests for

continuances in cases that do not include requests for new counsel. Each decision was
reached after consideration of several, but not all, of the same factors that were

State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Where a defendant seeks new
counsel, several factors are relevant .... Carman, 114 Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at 1209.
We examine these factors in turn.").
1

4

identified in Pratt and

e.g.,

V.

1

Idaho 1, 22-23 (1998)

(considering the number of prior requests for continuances in affirming the denial of the
motion for continuance to allow for additional collection of evidence); State v. Averett,
142 Idaho 879, 889 (Ct. App. 2006) (considering the timing of the motion, the fact that
the defendant had made other motions for continuances, the inconvenience to
witnesses, and the prejudice to the prosecution in affirming the denial of the motion for
continuance to resolve a discovery dispute and allow for adequate trial preparation);
State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 218-19 (Ct. App. 1998) (considering the timing of the

motion and the inconvenience to witnesses in affirming the denial of the motion for a
continuance to allow the defendant to subpoena witnesses who had already testified
v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 737-38

and been subject to cross examination);

(Ct. App. 1997) (considering the length of the requested continuance and prejudice to
the prosecution in affirming the grant of the State's motion for a continuance when a
necessary witness suddenly fell ill)2; State v. Irving, 118 Idaho 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1990)
(considering the timing of the motion, and the fact that the request for a continuance
was designed to manipulate the proceedings in affirming the denial of the motion for
continuance to allow an untimely motion to suppress).

While only a few of these

decisions actually acknowledge the list of factors that has been articulated in Pratt and
Carman, they all still considered the same factors, and those analyses were guided by

the facts of the particular case. Therefore, as demonstrated by these cases, a partial
application of the list of factors from Pratt and Carman is appropriate.

In Wheeler, the Court of Appeals actually pointed out that the district court's
determination that "a continuance of a few days" would be no more problematic than
excusing the jury for a long weekend. Wheeler, 129 Idaho at 738.
2
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That is, after all, how the doctrine of stare decisis works: "where the court has
decided a question of law in another case and a like state of facts is subsequently
presented, the rule of stare decisis applies .... " State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 441
(1991) (emphasis added). The application of prior case law does not require the new
case to present an identical factual scenario, just a similar factual scenario. In Pratt and
Carman, as in Ransom and Mr. Scales' case, the question of law at issue is whether the

district court erred in denying a request for a continuance. All four cases present similar
factual scenarios - the defendant asked for a continuance of the trial so that he might
receive effective assistance from trial counsel.

The only factual difference is the

underlying reason for the request for a recess or continuance. In Pratt and Carman, it
was because the defendant had decided to hire a different attorney. Pratt, 125 Idaho at
555; Carman, 114 Idaho at 792-93.

In Ransom, it was because the State had

dismissed one of the pending charges, and that action significantly altered the defense
strategy. Ransom, 124 Idaho at 706. In this case, it was because Mr. Scales wanted to
compose himself and finalize his strategy for his testimony in light of the evidence the
State offered, rather than offer ad hoc testimony which risked prejudicing his case.
(Tr., p.166, L.22 - p.167, L.2; Tr., p.170, L.4 - p.171, L.19.) Therefore, all these cases
present a like state of facts, and so, the factors identified in Pratt and Carman, which
inform the analysis on this question of law - whether the requested recess or
continuance should have been granted - are applicable in this case.
Considering the relevant factors identified in those prior decisions demonstrates
why the district court abused its discretion in denying the requested continuance. (See
App. Br., pp.5-8.) The State claims that the denial of that motion was justified because
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granting it may have

undue hardship on the prosecution and

witnesses because there might have

a need for rebuttal testimony following

Mr. Scales' testimony.
The State is mistaken in that conclusion.

The burden of a potential need for

rebuttal evidence existed from the outset of the trial. The trial was already scheduled to
last two days and the request for the recess was made one hour before the close of
business on the first day. Therefore, the proposed recess would not have created an
additional burden that did not already exist for the witnesses or the prosecutor. As a
result, the State's current contention does not justify the district court's decision to deny
the recess. The district court's only justification for denying that request was that "this is
the day set for trial, so we need to proceed." (Tr., p.169, Ls.9-10; see also Tr., p.-168,
Ls.1

1; Tr., p.170, Ls.6-7.) As such, it improperly denied that justifiable request for an

overnight recess based on a myopic, unreasoning, and arbitrary insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justified request for a recess, and so the decision to
deny the recess was an abuse of discretion.

Compare Pratt, 125 Idaho at 556; see

Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).

B.

The District Court's Decision To Deny The Request For A Recess Did Impact On
Several Of Mr. Scales' Constitutional Rights
Mr. Scales argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court's denial of his

request for a recess infringed on his right to testify in his own defense and his right to
effective assistance of counsel. Part of the analysis in reviewing the decision to deny a
motion for continuance is to determine whether that decision is so arbitrary as to violate
the defendant's constitutional rights based on the facts and circumstances of the

7

particular

as well as the rationales forwarded by the defendant in support of his

motion, since, generally, absent a violation of his substantial rights, a defendant will not
be prejudiced by a denial of a requested continuance.

Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589;

State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446,449 (1973).

The State makes two cursory points on this issue in its Respondant's Brief. First,
it asserts that Mr. Scales has not presented any legal authority supporting his position
that his constitutional rights had been infringed by the district court's denial of his
request for a recess. (Resp. Br., p.12 ("He has failed to show otherwise, or to cite to
any legal authority supporting his argument that a constitutional right was violated.")
That is untrue.

Mr. Scales cited some fourteen decisions from the United States

Supreme Court and the Idaho appellate courts which support his analysis that the denial
of the requested recess violated his constitutional rights. (See App. Br., pp.9-13.) The
State does not present any substantial argument or analysis that contradicts Mr. Scales'
analysis of that relevant case law. (See generally Resp. Br.)
Second, it contends that his request to be more relaxed does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation, and so, his entire argument should be rejected. (See Resp.
Br., p.12.) However, that assertion does not fairly represent the entirety of Mr. Scales'
argument, since he also argued that, if a recess were not granted, he would not be able
to get effective advice from counsel in order that he might provide meaningful testimony
in his own defense.

(Tr.,p.170, L.4-p.171, L.19.)

The State offers no argument

against the second half of Mr. Scales' argument. (See generally Resp. Br.) And, as it is
the second half of Mr. Scales' argument which speaks directly to the violation of his
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constitutional rights, the State's conclusory assertion that

is no constitutional

violation at issue in this case is also clearly wrong.
Therefore, under the facts of this case, the district court's decision to deny the
requested recess did infringe on Mr. Scales' constitutional rights.

The United States

Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the defendant has a right to testify on his
own behalf, and the Idaho Supreme Court has added that the right to testify extends to
allow thoughtful consideration with the advice of counsel in regard to that decision
without substantial interjection by the court.

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53

(1987); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 763 (1988). The defense strategy in this case
was centered around Mr. Scales' intent to offer testimony on his behalf. (Tr., p.165,
Ls.1

Tr., p.84, L.6 - p.86, L.19.) However, Mr. Scales argued to the district court

that, if the recess was not granted, he would not be able to give meaningful testimony
(implying that he wanted to consider his options regarding his testimony, or the scope
thereof, with his attorney). (Tr., p.170, Ls.4-13.)
Such reassessments of the defense strategy are normal, since an effective
defense team would want to make final decisions about its strategy in light of the
evidence the State actually presented to the jury. The State argues that the defense
had five months leading up to the trial to make those decisions (see, e.g., Resp.
Br., p.12), but that assertion fails to consider that several of those decisions are
necessarily contingent on the evidence the State actually offers during its case-in-chief.
Therefore, a competent defense team will reassess its position, potentially adjusting its
strategy, in response to the evidence actually presented by the State.
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(See App.

10-11 (discussing various considerations the
the close of the

team might

case-in-chief).)

To that point, Mr. Scales was only given five minutes to consult with counsel after
the close of the State's case in which to receive any advice, and yet, at the same time,
the district court also expected counsel to review the proposed final jury instructions.
(Tr., p.167, L.16 - p.168, L.15.)

Therefore, not only was there substantial judicial

interjection by the district court which frustrated Mr. Scales' right to testify on his own
behalf, which violated his Fifth Amendment rights, see Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53; Aragon,
114 Idaho at 763, that minimal amount of time to confer with counsel deprived
Mr.

of the effective assistance of counsel as well.

States,

e.g., Geders v. United

U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that the preventing communications between a

defendant and his attorney at a time "when an accused would normally confer with
counsel" violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights);

see also Perry v. Leeke,

488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984))

("'[The] Government violates the right to effective assistance of counsel when it
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions
about how to conduct the defense,"' also noting that a defendant normally confers with
his attorney after the State rests its case to make decisions about how to present the
defense's case).
Since the requested recess was appropriate and would have addressed these
very issues, the decision to deny the requested recess violated several of Mr. Scales'
constitutional rights.

Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Scales' conviction as a

result of the district court's erroneous denial of the request for a recess.
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CONCLUSION
Mr.

respectfu Ily

that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction

and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY
FY that on
31 st
of July, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
BENNETT ROBERT SCALES
INMATE #79009
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
DEBORAH A BAIL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
CRAIG A STEVEL Y
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S
E-MAILED BRI
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

12

